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taken to be one way of making that claim more speciﬁ
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4 Gopnik 1996; Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997, pp. 18–20In this paper, I examine the charge that Gopnik and Meltzoff’s ‘Child as Scientist’ program, outlined and
defended in their 1997 book Words, Thoughts and Theories is vitiated by a form of ‘cognitive individu-
alism’ about science. Although this charge has often been leveled at Gopnik and Meltzoff’s work, it has
rarely been developed in any detail.
I suggest that we should distinguish between two forms of cognitive individualism which I refer to as
‘ontic’ and ‘epistemic’ cognitive individualism (OCI and ECI respectively). I then argue - contra Ronald
Giere – that Gopnik and Meltzoff’s commitment to OCI is relatively unproblematic, since it is an easily
detachable part of their view. By contrast, and despite their explicit discussion of the issue, their commit-
ment to ECI is much more problematic.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences1. Introduction
In a number of papers in the 1990s, and in their 1997
book Words, Thoughts and Theories, Alison Gopnik and Andrew
Meltzoff defended a view of children’s conceptual development
known as the ‘Child as Scientist’ view.1 On this view there are
important parallels between the ways in which children acquire
new concepts and the ways in which scientists develop new
theories.2
Philosophers of science should be interested in Gopnik and
Meltzoff’s views for at least three reasons. First, Gopnik and Meltz-
off (henceforward GM) claim that if their view is correct, then
improvements in our understanding of conceptual change in chil-
dren will shed light on conceptual change in science. Secondly,
Gopnik and Meltzoff’s understanding of what scientiﬁc theories
are (and consequently the content of their claim that children’sll rights reserved.
97, 1998), Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl
s of her interests has evolved consi
ular the claim that they use ‘Bayes n
im that the same sort of processes
c.
).theories are like scientiﬁc theories) relies heavily on their under-
standing of parts of the philosophy of science literature.3 So philos-
ophers of science can contribute directly to the evaluation of GM’s
core claims. Finally, GM suggest that the Child as Scientist program
underpins an argument for scientiﬁc realism.4 This claim depends on
the idea that the sorts of mechanisms which underlie children’s con-
ceptual development are likely to issue in true theories. For cognitive
mechanisms which lead children to develop false theories of do-
mains which play a central role in their lives would be a massive
evolutionary disadvantage. So the cognitive mechanisms which
underlie children’s conceptual development are likely to be truth-
conducive. But if so and if the same mechanisms underlie the devel-
opment of scientiﬁc theories, then it appears to follow that scientiﬁc
theories are the product of truth-conducive mechanisms. This argu-
ment is obviously relevant to debates about at least some forms of
scientiﬁc realism.(1999).
derably since the 1990’s: much of it has focused on the learning mechanisms which
ets’ in doing so. (See in particular Gopnik & Schulz, 2004, 2007 Gopnik & Tenenbaum,
underlie children’ s acquisition of theories and scientists theorizing: indeed it could be
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ested in GM’s views undercuts the ﬁrst and the third. GM’s views
about the nature of science involve a commitment to a cluster of
views which I shall refer to as ‘Cognitive Individualism.’5 This leads
them to downplay the cognitive and epistemological signiﬁcance of
distinctive forms of social organization that are characteristic of
many forms of scientiﬁc enquiry. However, a signiﬁcant body of re-
cent work in analytic philosophy of science suggests that if we
ignore the social dimensions of scientiﬁc enquiry we miss something
which is distinctive of science, and essential to explaining its suc-
cess.6 This work suggests that there is a serious obstacle to the pro-
jects of learning about conceptual change in children by studying
conceptual change in science and vice versa. If so, the claims that
GM make for the relevance of developmental psychology to philoso-
phy of science cannot stand.
GM’s disregard of the social aspects of science has been criti-
cized before.7 However, these criticisms have typically failed to
specify which aspects of the social nature of science GM have ig-
nored, or why ignoring them is problematic. To criticise GM more
effectively we will need to distinguish between what I shall ‘ontic
cognitive individualism’ – a view about what theories are – and ‘epi-
stemic cognitive individualism’ – a view about what explains the
success of science. GM’s commitment to ontic cognitive individual-
ism is relatively unproblematic, since it turns out to be inessential
to their view. Their commitment to epistemic cognitive individual-
ism is both problematic and essential to their view. 8
In this paper, I shall draw on work by Philip Kitcher and Miriam
Solomon, to argue both that contemporary science involves a form
of division of cognitive labour, and that the existence and exact
form of this cognitive division of labour play an important role in
explaining the epistemic success of science. This second claim is
incompatible with the sort of epistemic cognitive individualism
which is essential to Gopnik and Meltzoff’s view.
Criticisms of GM’s commitment to epistemic cognitive individ-
ualism need to be developed with care, since, in their 1997 book
GM make some concessions to critics of epistemic cognitive indi-
vidualism and in particular to Kitcher’s views. However I shall ar-
gue that GM’s concessions do not go far enough: they do not
appreciate how deep the critique of epistemic cognitive individual-
ism cuts or how far their view would need to be revised in order to
accommodate it effectively.
2. The anti-individualist challenge to the child as scientist
program
To see why it is worth distinguishing between different kinds of
cognitive individualism in assessing GM’s position, consider the
following passage from Miriam Solomon’s brief commentary on
Gopnik (1996).
‘The Scientist as Child is not only incomplete, it is also inaccu-
rate. One important area of inaccuracy is the assessment of
the role of ‘social factors’ (this includes motivational, social,
political, economic inﬂuences) in scientiﬁc decision-making.5 The term ‘cognitive individualism’ has been used in a similar context by Downes Do
Section 3 below.
6 Hull (1988), Hankinson Nelson (1990), Longino (2002), Kitcher (1993), Downes (1993
7 Solomon (1996), Stich & Nicholls (1998), Giere (2002).
8 My understanding of the term ‘cognitive individualism’ has something in common w
individualism is the thesis that a sufﬁcient explanation for all cognitive activity will be prov
and adds, a few pages later ‘A cognitive-individualist account seeks an explanation of a cogn
as internal mechanisms’ (ibid, p. 454).
9 See footnote 6 above.
10 Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997, pp. 24–26).
11 Ibid, pp. 70–71.Gopnik thinks that ‘social factors must have little inﬂuence,
because, she asserts that children’s cognitive processes are sim-
ilar to scientists while their sociology is different. Even if Gop-
nik were granted these two assertions . . . social factors can still
play a crucial role in theory choice. I have argued . . . that scien-
tists sometimes form a consensus on the best theory while each
scientist involved is making a decision that is strongly and var-
iously affected by ‘social factors.’ Consensus can be brought
about by a variety of mechanisms.’
(Solomon, 1996, p. 549, italics mine)
Call the view that social factors do not play any role at all in the-
ory choice ‘Basic Cognitive Individualism.’ As Solomon points out,
many philosophers of science have argued that BCI is false.9
GM are not committed to BCI. They concede that in at least
some scientiﬁc ﬁelds – such as high-energy particle physics – a
social division of epistemic labor plays a crucial role in gathering
evidence for scientiﬁc theories; and evidence is surely one thing
which is relevant to theory choice.10 Furthermore, a commitment
to BCI is inconsistent with a central aspect of the Child as Scientist
view. On that view, there are important similarities between the
cognitive processes of scientists and children. Yet it would be absurd
to hold that a claim analogous to BCI was true of children. That
would involve holding that social factors played no role in the cogni-
tive development of children. That is false; GM say it is false; and
they cite evidence for its falsity.11
Arguably though, in the quoted passage, Solomon is not simply
objecting to BCI. She claims, after all, that social factors do not sim-
ply play some role in theory choice, but that they play ‘a crucial
role.’ However, she does not spell out here what this crucial role
is. So it is difﬁcult to assess the extent to which her criticism
undermines GM’s position. In particular, it is not clear from what
she says here whether the ‘crucial role’ that social factors play in
theory choice can explain what GM say is ‘the most important
thing about science, namely that it gets things right’ (Gopnik &
Meltzoff, 1997, p. 16). GM suggest, by contrast, that ‘it is difﬁcult
to see how the . . . sociological features of science could explain
its epistemological potency.’ (ibid p16).
3. Cognitive Individualism – A Brief Taxonomy
To assess whether GM’s commitment to cognitive individualism
is problematic, we need to look more carefully at how social factors
play a role in scientiﬁc cognition. In particular, we need to distin-
guish between individualist views of what scientiﬁc theories are,
and individualist theories aboutwhat explains the success of science
– between ontic and epistemic versions of cognitive individualism.
I shall use the phrase ‘ontic cognitive individualism’ (OCI for
short), to refer to the following pair of claims
OCI (i) Scientiﬁc theories are sets of representations
OCI (ii) The representations which constitute scientiﬁc theories
are in the heads of individual scientists.wnes (1993), whose work I have been inﬂuenced by in a number of ways. See also
), Thagard (2000), Solomon (2001), Goldman (1999, 2004).
ith that of Downes (1993). Downes deﬁnes cognitive individualism thus:‘cognitive
ided by an account of autonomous individual cognitive agents’ (Downes, 1993, p. 452):
itive phenomenon purely in terms of individuals’ psychological processes, understood
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trasted with the Platonist view that theories are sets of abstract ob-
jects such as propositions, or models conceived of set-theoretically;
and also with what one might call the ‘social materialist ’ idea that
theyarepartially constitutedbymaterial paraphernalia or apparatus,
externally embodied representations, or collective practices involv-
ing the competent use of such external material objects.12 (However,
it is not incompatible with the view that embodied representations,
apparati, or practices are causally necessary for the formation of the
sorts of sets of representations that constitute scientiﬁc theories.)13
GM’s commitment to OCI has been criticised by Ron Giere.14
OCI can be distinguished from the following claim, which I shall
refer to as ‘Epistemic Cognitive Individualism, or ECI:
ECI) It is possible to give an adequate explanation of the episte-
mic success of science by considering only the semantic and
epistemic relationships between sets of representations which
constitute theories and relationships between those theories
and those aspects of the world they purport to describe.
This formulation of ECI may initially seem opaque. Here is a brief
gloss. ECI is not simply the truistic view that semantic and epistemic
relationships between different representations and between those
representations and theworld theypurport to represent are relevant
to explaining the success of science. What ECI adds to this is the
claim that these are the only factorsweneed to considerwhen trying
to explain the epistemic success of science.15
ECI is an individualistic view because of what it denies: namely
that social relationships between thinkers are relevant to
explaining the success of science. It is a form of cognitive individu-
alism because what it is individualistic about is a form of cognition
– namely scientiﬁc cognition; and it is worth describing as
epistemic cognitive individualism because it focuses on questions
about how scientiﬁc theories are able to constitute knowledge; in
other words questions of how it acquires its epistemic status.16,17
ECI entails a commitment to denying that things other than
semantic or epistemic relationships between representations or
between those representations and the world are relevant to
explaining the epistemic success of science, and in particular, to
denying that features of the social and institutional organization
of science, such as social and institutional relationships between
individuals who generate or possess scientiﬁc theories are relevant
to explaining the epistemic success of science. Critics of ECI include
both Philip Kitcher and Miriam Solomon.1812 The contrast here is less sharp than one might hope, since there are views on which me
For the purposes of this paper I shall take someone to be committed to cognitive indi
representations of one individual, no matter what further view they take of the nature of
13 Giere (2002).
14 An earlier writer who might be regarded as a critic of OCI is Lynn Hankinson Nel
communities rather than individuals to be the primary subjects of knowledge attribution.
intended to establish the claim that individuals cannot know, or simply that individuals can
to compatible with OCI as I have formulated it.
15 I use the bland phrase ‘epistemic success of science’ so as to give a formulation of ECI wh
constitues scientiﬁc success. See van Fraassen, 1980, 2002.
16 See Section 4 (pp13ff below) for evidence of Gopnik and Meltzoff’s commitment to EC
17 ECI, as so formulated does not entail that representations are in the heads of individual t
about what scientiﬁc theories are.
18 Kitcher (1993), Solomon (1994, 1996, 2001). These are not the only critics of ECI to be fo
great deal, though for reasons of space I do not engage explicitly with her views in this pa
However, I take Harding to be less interested in the question of explaining why science is ep
of science in society we need to be fully aware of the ways in which the production and
19 Downes (1993).
20 Can a commitment to ECI could be motivated without OCI? One might think not. How
there is precedent for a philosopher of science to accept ECI while rejecting OCI.
21 These points may seem like trivial nit-picking. Nevertheless, getting clear about them
Individualism Gopnik and Meltzoff are committed to, and to assess how they might respo
22 See Downes (1999). Elsewhere, Downes has suggested that there are in fact three re
distinctions he makes there I am ignoring the reading of the Program which makes childr
super-scientists and children as social institutions.OCI and ECI are distinct and mutually compatible views which
are not (in the absence of further assumptions) mutually entailing.
They do not exhaust the range of views which might fall under the
label ‘Cognitive Individualism’. For example, they are both distinct
fromwhat I described in section 1 as ‘Basic Cognitive Individualism’:
one could deny BCI while accepting one or both of ECI and OCI.
(One might suppose he distinction that I am making between
ECI and OCI to have been anticipated - in a slightly different con-
text - by Stephen Downes. 19 Towards the end of a critique of (what
he calls) cognitive individualism, he distinguishes the point that cog-
nitive individualist accounts of science are descriptively inadequate
from the claim that they provide us with an inadequate basis for
making normative judgments about science. This distinction may
seem to parallel the distinction I make between OCI and ECI. How-
ever, it is not clear whether Downes thinks of OCI and ECI as being
distinct theses; and his view of the relationship between these issues
seems different frommine. He argues that since OCI presents us with
a descriptively inadequate view of science, the sorts of normative
views that are put forward by proponents of OCI are likely to be sus-
pect. By contrast, I suggest that even if Gopnik and Meltzoff were to
give up OCI, their commitment to ECI would still be problematic.20)
4. The ‘child as scientist’ view: some ambiguities
Before we can attempt to assess the nature and depth of GM’s
commitment to one or another version of Cognitive Individualism,
we need to look more closely at their views. We need to know
what exactly they are comparing children’s theories to; the precise
relationship which they take to hold between children’s theories
and scientiﬁc theories; and which aspects of children’s cognitive
structures they take to be theory-like. 21
4.1. What are GM comparing to what?
Here is one prominent formulation of the Child as Scientist
View:
‘Children’s conceptual structures, like scientists’, are theo-
ries . . . their conceptual development is theory-formation and
change and their semantic development is theory dependent.’
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 13) – emphasis mine
Steven Downes and Michael Bishop have noted that this quota-
tion can be understood in a number of ways.22 First, GM might bental representations are themselves partially constituted by external material objects.
vidualism provided that they take a scientiﬁc theory to be a subset of the mental
mental representations.
son (Hankinson Nelson (1990)) who argues that, strictly speaking we should take
However, it is not clear to me whether her arguments succeed in establishing – or are
only know in virtue of being socially situated. The second of these views seems to me
ich avoids prejudging issues between realists and constructive empiricists about what
I.
hinkers. It is a view about the best explanation of the success of scientiﬁc theories; not
und in the recent philosophy of science literature. Another from whom I have learnt a
per is Longino (2002). One might also take Harding (1986) to be an early critic of ECI.
istemically successful than in showing that in order to understand and assess the role
dissemination of scientiﬁc knowledge depends on a division of cognitive labour.
ever if the reading I give of Giere’s views in footnote 37 is correct it seems as though
will be important when we come to look at the question of which kinds of Cognitive
nd to objections on this score, something which is essential to my purposes here.
adings of the Child as Scientist program (Bishop & Downes, 2002). In terms of the
en like scientists, and adopting an approach which has elements of both children as
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concepts change and the ways in which individual scientists acquire
the concepts which belong to existing scientiﬁc theories. Alterna-
tively, they might be concerned with comparing the ways in which
children acquire new concepts and the ways in which the scientiﬁc
community as a whole comes to believe new theories, containing
new concepts.
Bishop and Downes argue that philosophers should be most
interested in the second reading of GM’s position. I agree. Con-
sider the argument for scientiﬁc realism mentioned in section
1. This purported to show that the fact that children’s theorizing
and scientiﬁc theorizing are subserved by the same mechanisms
gives us reason to think that scientiﬁc theorizing will tend to
yield true theories. As Bishop and Downes point out, a defender
of scientiﬁc realism needs to show that science as a whole has a
tendency to produce true theories, not that individual scientists
do. For, viewed at the level of the productions of individual sci-
entists, what our theory-producing mechanisms come up with is
false at least as often as it is true. It is only when we consider
science as a whole that what we have to defend is a surprising
record of success.23
I shall be arguing against this version of the Child as Scientist
view. If ECI is false – in other words, if the social organization of
science plays an important role in explaining its epistemic success,
then it is implausible that we can learn a great deal about either
the nature of science or the workings of the child’s mind by com-
paring them in the way that GM suggest. In other words, we should
see science as a whole as producing epistemic outputs which are
successful for reasons which are interestingly different from the
reasons for which individual children’s epistemic outputs are (epi-
stemically) successful. If ECI is false, then the epistemic success of
science depends, in non-trivial ways, on the organization of multi-
ple cognitive agents.
By contrast, children are individual cognitive agents. Whatever
their epistemic success depends on, it is not the way they are orga-
nized. This is not to say that the learning of children does not take
place in any kind of social setting - that claim is ﬂatly implausible,
Nor is it to say that the social setting plays no role in explaining
children’s learning. It is simply to point out that there is no reason
to suppose that there is anything within the mind of individual
children which plays an analogous role to that of the social struc-
ture of science, taken as a whole.24
There is good textual evidence that GM intend their view to be
understood in the way I have outlined. Their attempts to mine the-
ories about conceptual change within a scientiﬁc domain as a
whole – such as the work of Kuhn and Lakatos – for a plausible ac-
count of what children’s theories are seem hard to account for on
any other reading.25
Nevertheless, one might take GM to be arguing for a different
view – namely that young children and scientists rely on similar
mechanisms for generating and assessing theories.26 The
arguments which I shall be putting forward tell against this view
too. If ECI is false, then the epistemic success of science depends
on the interaction of a range of psychological mechanisms and
forms of social organization. If young children enjoy a comparable
measure of epistemic success, it is presumably produced by an23 Bishop and Downes (2002).
24 Among the evidence Gopnik and Meltzoff intend their view to be interpreted along the
conceptual change within a scientiﬁc domain as a whole – such as the work of Kuhn and
25 Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 25.
26 This is also seems suggested by some of Gopnik’s more recent work.
27 Glennan (2005) both notes and plays down the signiﬁcance of this ambiguity.
28 One reader commented that Gopnik and Meltzoff ‘would not be content with the thesis
means that they make stronger claims than this, I agree; however I argue that these strong
there are such analogies, I am at a loss to understand how they intend the passage I haveinteraction between whatever cognitive mechanisms are present
in young children and what is – presumably - a rather different
form of social organization. It may be reasonable to infer like
causes from like effects, it is less reasonable to infer that when
two like effects are produced by unknown causes interacting with
discernibly different further causes that the unknown causes are
the same – unless one thinks that the contribution of the unlike
causes is negligible.4.2. What relationship do GM think holds between children’s theories
and scientiﬁc theories?
In characterising the ‘Child as Scientist’ view, GM are unclear
about the kind of relationship they take to hold between scientiﬁc
theories and children’s theories.27 Sometimes, as in the quotation
given in section 3a) they seem to be saying that the two are the
same. Sometimes they say that they are similar (or perhaps
identical):
‘The central idea . . . is that processes of cognitive development
in children are similar to, perhaps even identical with; the pro-
cesses of cognitive development in scientists.’
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 3 , emphasis mine)
Sometimes they say that there is an analogy
‘Very young children just beginning to talk are engaged in pro-
found restructurings of several domains of their knowledge.
These restructurings are analogous to theory changes.’
(ibid p7 emphasis mine)
I shall argue below that when GM formulate their view in the
ﬁrst or second of these ways, they commit themselves to OCI.
When they formulate it in the third way they do not. GM will be
able, then, to meet criticisms of their view which depend on the
untenability of OCI by retreating from a formulation of the ﬁrst
or second sort to one of the third sort – that is by retreating from
a formulation couched in terms of identity or similarity to one
couched in terms of analogy.284.3. What do GM take theories to be?
GM characterize theories as follows:
‘A person’s theory is a system that assigns representations to
inputs just as one’s perceptual system assigns representations
to visual input or one’s syntactic system assigns representations
to phonological input. The representations . . . are . . . distinctive
in many ways . . . We can capture these distinctive structural
features by talking about the speciﬁc abstract, coherent, causal,
ontologically committed, counterfactual supporting entities and
laws of the theory . . . The representations are also operated on
by rules that lead to new representations . . . There are also dis-
tinctive functional relations between theoretical representa-
tions and the input to them; theories predict interpret and
explain data’
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 43)lines of this second interpretation: in particular their attempts to mine theories about
Lakatos – for a plausible account of what children’s theories are.
that there is analogy between children’s theories and scientiﬁc theories’. If this simply
er claims are untenable. If they mean that Gopnik and Meltzoff would not accept that
quoted.
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‘If we discovered that children’s representational system (sic)
had the features we have been describing (sc – those mentioned
in the paragraph I have just cited) we would . . . be licensed in
saying that children had theories.’
GM’s identiﬁcation of theories with representation-forming
systems, and the analogy which they draw with the visual system
is puzzling. It is natural to think of a theory as something which
consists of a set of representations, rather than a system that pro-
duces such representations. Furthermore the (admittedly enthym-
ematic) argument that GM put forward for holding that children
have theories seems to involve showing that some of the sets of
representations have the same features as those sets of representa-
tions that we normally characterize as scientiﬁc theories. But if this
argument gives us reason to believe anything, it is that certain sets
of representations in children’s minds are theories, not that the
systems which form those representations are.
(This distinction may appear to be trivial, 29 especially if the fact
that the word ‘system’ means something rather different in the two
phrases is overlooked. In the phrase ‘system of representations’, ‘sys-
tem’ means ‘an organized collection’ while in the phrase ‘representa-
tion forming system’ it means a mechanism or set of mechanisms for
producing representations. Consequently, what it makes sense to say
about ‘systems of representations’ – and what might conceivably be
true of them is rather different from what it might make sense to say
– and what might be true of representation-forming systems.)
Since the claim that theories are representation-forming sys-
tems, rather than systems of representations, does not surface
again, I shall take GM not to be committed to it but instead to
the more plausible view that, for which they have in fact argued,
that theories are systems of representations, rather than represen-
tation-forming systems. 30
5. GM’s Commitment to OCI and ECI
In section 3c) I suggested that on a charitable reading of their
argument for the claim that young children have theories, GM’s
argument involved an appeal to the idea that theories are sets of
representations in individuals’ heads. If so, it turns on a commit-
ment to OCI.31
This is also true if we take GM only to be claiming that the
mechanisms involved in belief change in children are the same
as those involved in scientiﬁc theory change. The mechanisms
which explain cognitive change in children are certainly mecha-
nisms which operate on sets of representations in the minds of
individuals. If the same mechanisms are working when scientiﬁc
theories change, then what they are working on must also be sets
of representations in the minds of individuals.29 It seemed so to one anonymous reader.
30 I thank Josh Cowley for pressing me on this.
31 In Section 5 below I shall argue that this commitment is one they could easily avoid.
32 GM’s use of the word ‘hierarchy’ at this point is not entirely transparent. From the cont
the idea of a set of theories being hierarchically organized in the sense in which one migh
those in another domain – say, biology. I take ‘hierarchy’, when used correctly, to refer to on
extreme, and one sided deference over epistemic and other matters between individuals
discussion, - and in particular, the fact that GM do not, for example, contrast hierarchical s
way exchanges of information between inquirese who see one another and treat on anoth
refer, by substitution of part for whole, to any form of social organization that might be ch
un-nuanced understanding of what scholars in various areas have said about the role of soc
more nuanced view.
33 I am grateful to a reader, name unknown to me (who is not the anonymous reader m
position.
34 As both Thagard (1999) and Longino (2002) suggest, many authors writing on the
dichotomizing view on which the causation of beliefs is either rational or social, but not bo
applies here.GM’s commitment to ECI comes out when they write:
‘A cognitive view of science . . . might provide at least a partial
explanation of the most important thing about science, namely
that it gets things right. In contrast it is difﬁcult to see how the
(phenomenological and) sociological features of science could
explain its epistemological potency.’
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 16 – italics and brackets
mine)
However, GM’s commitment to ECI is qualiﬁed in one important
respect. For they concede that the social organization of science
may be relevant to explaining something which is relevant to its
epistemic success. It can explain how scientists are able to form
true beliefs in situations where it is hard to ﬁnd evidence in favor
of a particular view. As they put it:
. . . Paucity of evidence leads to the division of labor and to many
of the . . . institutions characteristic of science . . . To ﬁnd evi-
dence of a Higgs boson, you need, quite literally an Act of Con-
gress. (p24)
Nevertheless, they insist that while the division of labor may
play a signiﬁcant role in collecting evidence for scientiﬁc theories,
it plays no role in explaining why the sorts of procedures which are
involved in assessing scientiﬁc theories are particularly successful
in providing us with true theories.
‘It’s easy to see how the division of labor could result from the
need for various forms of evidence . . . What is extremely hard to
see is how . . . hierarchy could lead to truth, or how the division
of labor could lead to theory formation and conﬁrmation’
Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 2432
One might think that GM are not really committing themselves
to anything like ECI here, and are instead claiming explanations of
the success of science will need to involve reference both to repre-
sentational processes in the heads of scientists, and to institutional
factors.33 However it is hard to see how GM’s words can bear this
reading. Admittedly GM say that a cognitive view of science provides
us with a ‘partial explanation’ of ‘why science gets things right’ and
not that it gives a complete explanation. Taken on its own, this claim
would of course be consistent with the view that a complete expla-
nation would involve both cognitive, and social factors. However, GM
do not continue by claiming that institutional factors can also pro-
vide us with a partial explanation of how science gets things right.
Nor do they simply say, as someone who thought that GM were
not committed to ECI might hope, that it is difﬁcult to see how these
features can lead to truth or conﬁrmation on their own. They say that
it is difﬁcult to see how they could do so, period.34
Both of the critics of ECI whose work I will be examining in
what follows hold that scientiﬁc division of labor plays an impor-
tant role in explaining how science arrives at truth. So, it seemsBut this does not show that they do not have the commitment.
ext of the quotation t they are clearly talking about social hierarchies rather than, say,
t (or might not) take the result in one domain – say psychology to be subordinate to
e possible set of social relationships between scientists – namely one in which there is
in one group and individuals in another group. However, given the context of their
ocial structures with other kinds of social structure ones in which there are free two-
er as epistemic equals – it seems plausible to take GM’s use of the word ‘hierarchy’ to
aracteristic of science. To interpret GM thus is admittedly to attribute to them a very
ial structures in explaining belief change in science I see no evidence that they have a
entioned in footnote 20) for suggesting this interpretation of Gopnik and Meltzoff’s
role of scientiﬁc factors in the ﬁxation of scientiﬁc belief appear to subscribe to a
th. The wording of Gopnik and Meltzoff’s position seems to suggest that this criticism
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to engage adequately with signiﬁcant critics of their position.
Moreover, if GM’s formulations can be read as saying that we need
to appeal to both representational and institutional factors in order
to explain the success of science, then presumably their view could
equally well be formulated as follows:
‘An institutional view of science . . . might provide at least a par-
tial explanation of the most important thing about science,
namely that it gets things right. In contrast it is difﬁcult to see
how the representational features of science could explain its
epistemological potency.’
I suspect that GM would regard this as a travesty of their view. I
think they would be right to do so. But on the interpretation of their
view that I am considering (and rejecting) they would have few
grounds for objecting to this formulation.
GM do, admittedly, point out that various features of social life
contribute to young children’s capacity to develop cognitively:
These include leisure, lack of other demands on their time and,
most importantly ‘a community of adults who are designed to
act in ways which further the children’s cognitive progress’ and
which ‘has an interest in passing on information which is relevant
to the child.’ 35 However, these observations provide no reason for
qualifying GM’s commitment to ECI. ECI is a view about what ex-
plains the epistemic success of scientists. But these points are ways
in which GM take the social setting of young children to differ from
(and be epistemically superior to) that of scientists. So they cannot
be taken as evidence of GM’s holding that the social setting of scien-
tists contributes to their epistemic success.
Signiﬁcantly, GM’s commitment to ECI does not seem to depend
on their commitment to OCI. The points they make which suggest
they accept ECI seem to be independent of any claims about what
scientiﬁc theories are. For example, they are compatible with the
view that scientiﬁc theories are abstract entities such as sets of
sentences; or sets of models – in either Giere’s sense on which a
model is a kind of abstract entity; or in the technical sense of mod-
el taken from model theory.36
Furthermore, since ECI is a view about the nature of scientiﬁc
theories, and the arguments in favour of it depend on GM’s views
about what could and what could not plausibly explain progressive35 Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997, p. 25).
36 Giere (1988).
37 See footnote 23 for further discussion of Giere (1988).
38 Giere (2002). Giere’s arguments against OCI draw some support from Hutchins’ discuss
287) However, while Hutchins does provide us with a very interesting example of the distr
navy he has very little to say about the social distribution of cognitive labour in the formula
Meltzoff seems more pertinent to my immediate purposes than a detailed discussion of H
39 As an anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this paper has pointed out to me, the
this criticism. For in some of Giere’s earlier work, he can be read as supporting a form of c
same referee – ‘a tour de force of cognitive individualism.’ (Downes (1993) also classiﬁes
matters are more complex. In the early parts of that work Giere certainly makes a numb
critique of Bayesianism and his use of satisﬁcing models to explain scientiﬁc decision-mak
approach here may well involve a commitment some form of epistemic cognitive individ
cognitive individualism. Most obviously his 1988 view of theories does not seem to be an
models are regarded as abstract entities. (ibid p 78) This is a view from whose unabashed P
representations in his 2002. Another reason for doubting Giere (1988)’s commitment to
background knowledge in science being best thought of us as knowledge ‘embodied in the
this line of thought has contributed in large measure to the prominence of anti-individualis
think about the relationship between Giere’s earlier and later work).
40 Giere (2002).
41 This is not to say that items of this sort constitute representations independently of an
enable them to function as representations without having some kind of internal represent
that we should take these use-enabling representations to be scientiﬁc theories – or inde
42 Giere backs up his claim by reference to case studies in Knorr-Cetina (1999).
43 A view of this sort would, of course, be no help to Gopnik and Meltzoff: they do not b
illustrate the fact that Giere’s point about the way in which knowledge of theories is sociall
of things theories are. A fortiori, it does not entail that they are not mental representationscientiﬁc change, GM’s commitment to it is independent of the
question of whether they take children’s theories to be identical
to, similar to, or merely analogous to scientiﬁc theories. 37
6. Giere’s Critique of Ontic Cognitive Individualism
Ronald Giere has recently argued that an adequate account of
scientiﬁc knowledge should avoid a commitment to OCI because
scientiﬁc knowledge involves ‘distributed cognition’.38 Distributed
cognition involves the co-operation of groups of agents interacting
with scientiﬁc apparatus in such a way that it becomes appropriate
to regard the locus of the representational system which constitutes
a scientiﬁc theory as extending beyond the skin of a single knowing
subject. Giere is here denying OCI ii while accepting OCI i.39 By con-
trast, GM are committed to both components of OCI. If Giere is cor-
rect, there seems to be trouble for GM.
Perhaps problematically, Giere seems to be committed either to
the existence of ‘group minds’ or to the possibility of there being
representations without representing subjects. Giere opts deci-
sively for the second horn of this dilemma, suggesting that
although scientiﬁc theories are representations, they are not inter-
nalmental representations.40 Rather, they are representations in the
mundane and non-mentalistic sense that diagrams on paper, scale
models, explicit written mathematical descriptions of phenomena
under consideration and the like are representations.41
Giere cites in support of his rejection of OCI the highly plausible
claim that it is characteristic of many contemporary scientiﬁc the-
ories that no particular individual need know everything that is a
part of the theory.42 However it is unclear whether this claim sup-
ports Giere’s position. For it seems to be compatible with a wide
range of views about what theories are, including the traditional
‘syntactic’ view, in which scientiﬁc theories are regarded as sets of
sentences in a formalized language, (where sets of sentences are re-
garded as abstract entities) and a version of the semantic view,
which equates theories with sets of models, where models are re-
garded as set-theoretical entities.43
However, this point does not help GM, who are committed to
scientiﬁc theories’ being sets of representations rather than ab-
stract entities. Someone who thinks that scientiﬁc theories are
internal representations might try to accommodate Giere’s pointion of distributed cognition in Hutchins (1995). (See for example Giere, 2002, pp. 286–
ibuted performance of a complex cognitive task - namely that of navigation in the US
tion or evaluation of scientiﬁc theories. So a focus on Giere’s discussion of Gopnik and
utchins’ views.
re is something ironic about the fact that it should be Giere in particular who has made
ognitive individualism: indeed, Giere (1988) can be regarded as – in the words of the
Giere as a cognitive individualist.) However, a close reading of Giere (1988) suggests
er of programmatic statements along cognitive individualist lines. In particular, his
ing seem to ﬁt well within a cognitive individualist framework. More speciﬁcally, hia
ualism. It is less clear, however that in this work, Giere is committed to ontologica
instance of OCI, for he holds that theories are clusters of models, (1988, p 82), where
latonism he appears to have retreated in favour of the view that theories are materia
OCI is his use of the notion of embodied knowledge, as when he speaks of some
technology used in performing experiments.’ (ibid p104). I suspect that following ou
m in some of his later work. (I am indebted to an anonymous reader for pressing me to
yone’s use of them as such; nor that anyone could use the items in a way that would
ational capacity. However, it would take non-negligible further argument to establish
ed theories of any sort.
elieve that theories are abstract entities of any sort. The point of introducing it is to
y distributed shared does not seem to entail any particular conclusion about the sorts
s.l
l
t
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out of representations in the heads of groups of scientists. However
a view of this sort would not help GM much either, since it still re-
quires a denial of OCI ii. In saying that scientiﬁc theories were con-
stituted out of representations in the heads of several individuals,
one would be conceding an important difference between them
and the sorts of things which GM think developmental psycholo-
gists should be studying.44 For those seem to be, almost by deﬁni-
tion, sets of representations within the head of individuals.
Alternatively or additionally, one might suggest that Giere
ought to allow for a distinction between two different sorts of
things that might be called scientiﬁc theories. In other words,
one might want to distinguish between the complete theory of
any given area – which, as Giere suggests, might not be represent-
able by any one individual, and different individual’s ‘takes’ on or
understandings of the theory. As Staley points out, different scien-
tists working in a highly collaborative area may disagree over the
signiﬁcance of a particular experimental result.45 Distinguishing
between ‘personal’ and ‘complete’ theories in the way suggested
here helps to explain such phenomena.
However, although Giere might concede that distributed cogni-
tion requires some sort of representational resources at the indi-
vidual level, it is not obvious that, or why, he need concede that
these representations are theory-like. They may, for example, in-
volve things that are better regarded as the representational
underpinnings of practical abilities to use the theory, rather than
as themselves being theories.
However, there is a way out for GM. In section 3b, I pointed out
that GM wavered in their statements of the relationship between
children’s theories and scientiﬁc theories between claims of iden-
tity, similarity, and analogy. As far as Giere’s critique of the Child
as Scientist program is concerned, it matters which of these formu-
lations we adopt. The claim that scientiﬁc theories are the very
same sorts of thing as children’s theories seems incompatible with
a recognition of the distributed nature of scientiﬁc theories. By
contrast, claims about similarities or analogies between them are
not undermined by points of this sort.
Advocates of the Child as Scientist program can, then, respond
to Giere’s critique by retreating from the claim that scientiﬁc the-
ories and children’s theories are the same kinds of thing to the
claim that they develop in analogous ways. After all two things
of different sorts surely can develop in analogous ways.46
One might object that claims about the existence of analogies
between the ways in which scientiﬁc theories develop and the
ways in which children’s understanding of the world develop are
unhelpfully vague. A defender of the Child as Scientist view needs
to give a speciﬁcation of the ways in which these two processes are
analogous. Nevertheless GM’s discussions of the ways in which
particular examples of children’s theories develop do precisely this.
One might also object that retreating from a version of the Child as
Scientist program formulated in terms of identity to one formu-
lated in terms of analogy might be seen as an epistemically retro-
grade step since it involves abandoning a claim with more content
in favor of one with less. However, since GM waver between for-
mulations of the Child as Scientist Program which speak of identity
and those which speak of analogy, we might reply that the sugges-
tion that they should abandon the ﬁrst in favour of the second44 This might seem obvious. However, developmental psychologists in the Vygotskyan t
45 Staley (2005).
46 Whether GM would accept this suggestion I do not know. I am only claiming they shou
with some of the claims that GMmake, and which would enable them to salvage at least par
and Meltzoff’s proposal along these lines, though without giving this rationale.
47 I am grateful to the anonymous reader cited in footnote 20 for pressing this objection
48 Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997, pp. 39,42).amounts to a suggestion which increases rather than decreases
the contentfulness of their view.
A further objection is that understanding the Child as Scientist
Program in the way I have suggested is incompatible with a key
claim of GM’s – namely, that the mechanisms which underpin the-
ory change in children are the same mechanisms as those which
underpin theory change in mature scientists.47 To this, I have three
comments. First, it is not immediately obvious that the suggestion
that these two views are incompatible is true. There is no a priori
reason why the same mechanisms should not be involved in the
development of two different, but analogously structured kinds of
thing. Secondly, even if the suggestion is correct, there is a natural
response, namely to suggest that someone who thinks that children’s
theories are analogous to scientiﬁc theories might consider the pos-
sibility that the mechanisms which underlies the changes are, while
not identical, also analogous. Indeed, when GM write that
‘These restructurings (ie, the ones undergone by young children
just learning languages – current author) are analogous to the-
ory changes’
it is natural to think that this claim, if true, would at best support a
claim that the mechanisms involved in these restructurings were
analogous. Thirdly, at the beginning of this paper, I speciﬁed three
reasons why the Child as Scientist program might be of interest to
philosophers of science. Only one of those reasons depended on
the idea that the mechanisms involved in theory change in scien-
tists and in children are exactly the same. So whatever GM’s own
view of the matter I claim that the Child as Scientist program should
be of interest even if the claim about identity of mechanisms cannot
be sustained.
7. ECI and the child as scientist program
7.1. Why ECI matters
GM’s commitment to ECI is much harder to excise than their
commitment to OCI. On their view, part of the appeal of the idea
that there is an analogy between the development of science and
the development of children’s theories about the world is that chil-
dren’s understanding of the world appears to resemble our more
sophisticated scientiﬁc understanding because both involve exam-
ples of progressive convergence on an accurate portrayal of the
world via processes which include episodes of revolutionary
change.48 An obvious corollary is that if we want to exploit the anal-
ogy to help us see how children’s understanding of the world devel-
ops then we will need to draw on our understanding of what it is
about science that accounts for its having those features. In other
words we will want to appeal to features of science which make it
epistemologically special. If children’s ways of understanding the
world can be shown to lack these features, then this counts heavily
against the Child as Scientist program.
In this section I shall argue that contemporary science involves
a form of division of cognitive labor, and that this division of cog-
nitive labor plays an important role in explaining the epistemic
success of science. If so, then ECI is false.
Many social factors other than the division of cognitive labour
affect the outcome of scientiﬁc decisions. These include peerradition, such as Rogoff & Toma (1997) and Gauvain (1998, 2001).might disagree.
ld: it is a plausible way of responding to Giere’s criticism which is at least compatible
t of their position. I note that Glennan (2005) has also proposed understanding Gopnik
.
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cal commitments on the part of scientists and so on.49 However
in order to refute ECI it is not enough to establish that social pro-
cesses play some role in explaining why scientiﬁc beliefs change.
We must also show that these features play an important role in
explaining the epistemic success of science.50 The arguments that I
shall examine support this claim. It is much harder to establish that
the factors mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph play a po-
sitive epistemic role than that the division of cognitive labour does.51
The arguments I consider will not simply be aimed at showing
that the existence of a form of division of cognitive labor in science
plays a role in explaining the success of science. They will also sup-
port the claim that the particular form that this division of labor
takes plays a role in explaining this success. This will help to defuse
a certain kind of response to attacks on ECI which involves conced-
ing that certain socially mediated processes are important in
mature science; and that such processes do not have a similar in-
put into the content of children’s theorizing; but then suggesting
that children’s theorizing might receive an analogous kind of input
from some other source.
Suppose, for example, that one could show that extra-scientiﬁc
values played a role in making science epistemically successful. A
defender of the child as scientist program might suggest that ex-
tra-scientiﬁc values communicated to children by their care-givers
could play an analogous role in the scientiﬁc theorizing of children.
If the argument being put forward by critics of ECI simply showed
that science involved some kind of division of cognitive labor, a
similar defense might be mounted: perhaps whatever it is that is
important about the existence of a division of cognitive labor in
mature science is supplied from somewhere else in children’s the-
orizing. I shall argue, though, than when we look at the details of
the positions which Kitcher and Solomon put forward, responses
of this sort are quite implausible. It is hard to see how the value-
based argument, or a possible argument based on the role of
peer-pressure in scientiﬁc decision-making could be developed in
a way that made this sort of response in question as implausible.
7.2. ECI rejected (I): Kitcher
In their 1997 book, GM respond to suggestions that their posi-
tion is weakened by their commitment to some forms of cognitive
individualism via a discussion of Kitcher (1993).52 They argue that49 Further arguments which might be thought to undermine the plausibility of ECI can be
Nelson (1990) that scientiﬁc knowledge is necessarily knowledge possessed by a commun
involves justiﬁcations by the standard of a particular scientiﬁc community (Longino, 200
important role in explaining the epistemic fertility of science (Thagard, 2000). I focus on K
and Hankinson Nelson aut hold that nothing describable as science could be done by a singl
labour, even though they develop this insight in very different ways from Kitcher (1993) (w
the phrase.) The work by Thagard which I have cited develops the idea of a ‘division of co
50 So a good argument here cannot simply rely on pointing out the extent to which t
developments (as do for example Faucher et al., 2002). It needs to show that these value
requires substantial argument to show that it is the case. Without such argument, the poi
equally successful in some other cultural matrix than the one it actually developed in.
51 Note that if such arguments could be given, they would strengthen, rather than weak
52 Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997, pp. 24–26).
53 Kitcher (1993). It is perhaps only fair to mention that – as an anonymous referee of
enthusiasm for the ‘Child-as-Scientist’ Program. See in particular Kitcher (1988) where he
and and processes to be found in the history of the sciences) and conﬁdent that our under
advanced by research on how they (or their con-speciﬁcs modiﬁed their childhood concep
54 In Solomon (2001) Miriam Solomon objects that Kitcher’s analysis often seems overly
scientists have impure motivations, it says less about the possibility that social biases may h
beside the point. For I take it that Kitcher’s institutional science is possible even in the absen
have always succeed in channeling impure motivations in a productive manner.aim is not to
that the institutional science is possible even in the absence of pure motivations. It doe
channeling impure motivations in a productive manner.
55 Wray (2000). Wray argues for this point by considering Thomas Sprat’s account of the
exemplary institution. But the point may seem plausible even if we regard Sprat’s accoun
56 There is also not much reason to think of them as having been shaped by natural force
why we should not expect natural selection to select for optimal belief producing strategthe existence of a division of cognitive labor in science is not itself
enough to undermine the Child as Scientist Program, suggesting that
this division of labor might arise from the fact that the sorts of prob-
lem with which these scientists are concerned are ones that are
either particularly difﬁcult, and so require either the cognitive re-
sources of more than one individual or the collection of data that
is especially hard to come by.
However, Kitcher in fact argues thatwehave reasons to reject ECI
which go beyond the fact that scientiﬁc progress needs collective
evidence gathering. He argues that scientiﬁc progress is dependent
on the existence of institutions which ﬁne tune the sorts of reward
structures that are required to motivate scientists to research pro-
ductively. On Kitcher’s view, the success of science depends on the
efﬁcient working of invisible hand mechanisms. Scientists are typi-
cally not motivated by a simple and disinterested desire to ﬁnd the
truth. They may be moved by self-interested concerns, such as the
desire for prestige, self-advancement, and power. Nevertheless, pro-
vided the social institutions of science have the right sort of reward
structure, the overall goal of ﬁnding truth will be served. On this
view,whatdistinguishes science fromother formsof cognitiveactiv-
ity, and explains its success in arriving at approximately true theo-
ries, is that it involves social institutions which have the right sort
of reward structure, a reward structurewhich is ﬁnely-tuned to pro-
ducing the kinds of results which we value in science.53,54
While it is clearly true that children’s theorizing, like that of
adult scientists, takes place in a social setting there is no obvious
reason, absent further argument, to think that the social settings
in which children’s theorizing takes place provide them with an
analogous motivational structure. There are at least two reasons
for thinking that it does not. First, child-rearing practices seem to
vary enormously from culture to culture. It would be surprising,
to say the least, if all of these different practices gave rise to the
same ﬁnely tuned reward structure, let alone the same ﬁnely-tuned
reward structure as that of a practice as culturally speciﬁc as con-
temporary Western science. Secondly, as Brad Wray has pointed
out, we have good reason to think that insofar as the institutions
of contemporary Western science are ﬁne-tuned to produce moti-
vational structures which do contribute to the success of science,
we have good reason to think that they do so because they have
been consciously designed to do so.55 There is no reason to think
of child rearing-practices as having been shaped by conscious design
in this way.56found in the work authors such as Lynn Hankinson Nelson, who argues in Hankinson
ity; Helen Longino who has argued that the form of justiﬁcation involved in science
2, ch. 4); and Paul Thagard , who has argued that collaboration plays a particularly
itcher and Solomon primarily for reasons of space.One might argue that both Longino
e individual they have in common the idea that science involves a division of cognitive
ho himself develops it differently from Harding (1986), who seems to have originated
gnitive labor’ in another fruitful direction.
he development of (Western) science has depended signiﬁcantly on wider cultural
s are essential to the epistemic success of science. While this may be true, it would
nt is suggestive but hardly conclusive: one might think that science could have been
en my attack on ECI.
a predecessor to this paper pointed out to me – Kitcher had earlier expressed some
writes: ‘I’m serious about the symmetry (between children’s conceptual development
standing of the processes through which scientists restructure their concepts will be
ts.’
optimistic: while it may explain how good science is possible even when individual
ave negative effects on the development of science. For my purposes, this is somewhat
ce of pure motivations. It does not follow - and nor should we take it to –structures we
show that impure motivations are always a good thing, but to explain how successful
s not follow - and nor should we take it to –structures we have always succeed in
history of the Royal Society. (Wray, 2000, pp. 171–2), which we might regard as an
t with more skepticism than Wray does.
s which might mimic such conscious design: see pp. 30–1 below for a discussion as to
ies.
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and that what the argument requires here is empirical evidence
about the ways in which institutions shape the motivations of chil-
dren on the one hand, and mature scientists on the other. However
this response does not help GM much. For it concedes that a de-
fense of a plausible version of the Child as Scientist program will
require empirical study of the role which the social setting of chil-
dren plays in enabling their normal cognitive development. GM do
not engage in any empirical study of this sort and it is not clear that
their version of the Child as Scientist Program leaves them any
room to do so. (GM do hold that the social setting of children
may be relevant to their cognitive development. However, their
view of how it might do so is extremely limited: the only possibil-
ity they consider is that social interactions provide children with
more data to theorize about.57 If the arguments of this paragraph
are correct this is not the only possibility they need to consider in
order to make their case.58)
A defender of the Child of Scientist program might argue that
although Kitcher’s analysis of the workings of science shows that
social factors will play a role in explaining the success of science
in situations in which a division of cognitive labour is required, sci-
entiﬁc enquiry does not always require a division of labour of this
sort. If so, and if the sorts of situation in which children are in are
ones which do not require a division of labour of this sort then the
factors which Kitcher considers can be disregarded.
GM suggest that the reason that science typically involves a
division of epistemic labour is that the problems faced by mature
scientists are difﬁcult and typically require co-operative evidence
gathering. An alternative view, which seems to underpin Kitcher’s
work, is that the successful prosecution of scientiﬁc enquiry in-
volves the investigation of competing hypotheses by competing
groups.59 If correct, a view like Kitcher’s would explain the extent
to which the institutions of science often seem to function in such
a way as to promote competition as well as co-operation; while on
GM’s account, this would be at best a merely incidental matter,
and at worst somewhat surprising.60
A defender of the Child as Scientist program might suggest in
response that adults and children do not need to be motivated in
the same kinds of ways in order to engage in the sorts of cognitive
processes which lead to successful science. Indeed, one possible
explanation of the extent to which impure motivations play a role
in explaining the success of science is that these impure motiva-
tions are needed in order to restore to mature scientists the sort
of intense impulse to engage in theory-construction which is nat-
ural (and perhaps even explicable in evolutionary psychological57 Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 209 See Section 7 below for further discussion.
58 One thing that seems to be missing from Gopnik and Meltzoff’s discussion of the w
discussion of the way in which either scientists or young children respond to testimony. It’s
that Goldman’s BABA account of belief acquisition, on which individuals tend to acquire bel
is a plausible account of belief acquisition in early childhood there is at least some reason
beliefs. (Goldman, 2004) (I would like to thank an anonymous reader for drawing my atte
59 The word ‘partly’ is not simply a ‘hedge’ here: someone moved by this line of thought
some role in explaining the division of epistemic labour but only that this is not the whole s
epistemic labour across different branches of science: if Gopnik and Meltzoff’s account was
a spectrum from area to area, depending on the subject matter.
60 See for example Strevens (2003) on the role of the norm of priority in scientiﬁc publi
61 I owe this way of seeing things to conversation with Josh Cowley.
62 To make this account at all plausible one would need to provide some account of the r
beyond mere armchair psychology see Schwitzgebel (1999) – although it is worth not
motivational structures.
63 As I have already noted, a version of the Child as Scientist program which develops t
philosophically interesting than one that looks for analogies between children and scienc
64 One non-question-begging response would be to suggest that the sorts of mechanism
duplicate mechanisms which operate at the personal level in young children. But, as Bish
nothing to suggest that it is actually true. At best, Gopnik and Meltzoff would need to provid
parallels on the basis of an ‘inference to the best explanation’ given the data of paralle
understanding of various domains develop. However, it’s not clear to me how robust the
65 Downes (2001).terms) in young children. On this view, the institutions of contem-
porary science would be to enable the motivation of competition
against other scientists to substitute for a kind of innately supplied
‘competition against nature’ in the child.61,62
This response involves conceiving of the Child as Scientist pro-
gram along lines which see an analogy between the ways in which
children and individual scientists develop theories, rather than an
analogy between children’s development and the development of
science as a whole.63 The underlying idea is that any kind of expla-
nation of the success of science will have to appeal to the engage-
ment of the right kind of cognitive mechanisms, and that these
mechanisms might be engaged differently in adults and children.
However, this begs the question against critics of ECI. For their view
is that some of the key mechanisms that we should appeal to in
explaining the success of science work on an intrapersonal rather
than an interpersonal level.64
7.3. Problems with ECI (2): Miriam Solomon
These points suggest that Kitcher’s work presents a major prob-
lem to the Child as Scientist Program. However, Kitcher’s account
of the role of institutions in science has been challenged by Ste-
phen Downes who argues that Kitcher’s account wavers between
what he calls a ‘thick’ view of agency for the purposes of describing
the phenomena which it sets out to explain, and a ‘thin’ view for
the purposes of explaining those same data.65 By a ‘thin’ view of
agency, Downes means the sort of view of agency which is prevalent
in neo-classical economics – in other words, one which views of
agency as involving the rational maximization of some unitary good;
while by a ‘thick’ view he means one which takes into account the
ways in which human beings can be experimentally demonstrated
to fall short of full rationality, and the empirical differences that exist
between different forms of motivation.
Arguably, Kitcher’s use of a thin view of agency simply involves
a resort to a standard scientiﬁc strategy - that of constructing an
idealizing model for explanatory purposes. However, within the
particular dialectical context of a debate with GM about the merits
and defects of ECI, Downes’ point seems particularly signiﬁcant.
For it seems reasonable for researchers whose main concern is
with giving a psychologically realistic picture of the sorts of human
cognitive capacities that underlie our capacity for engaging in suc-
cessful science to discount criticisms of their position which are
based on a model of science which incorporates a psychologically
unrealistic account of agency. Miriam Solomon has put forward a
view which offers a way out of this impasse by offering a line ofay in which social setting can inﬂuence cognitive development is any sophisticated
plausible that there are big and important differences here: where as one might think
iefs via a contagion-like process from individuals with whom they are socially bonded,
to think that at least some scientist operate with a different heuristic for accepting
ntion to the relevance of Goldman’s work to the issues discussed here).
need not deny that the sorts of considerations that Gopnik and Meltzoff adduce play
tory. One good reason for taking this view is simply the pervasiveness of the division of
correct one might expect the extent to which this phenomenon occurred to vary across
cation.
elevant mechanisms in each case. For examples of work along these lines which goes
icing that his view suggests that children and scientists have surprisingly similar
he idea of an analogy between children and adult scientists seems considerably less
e as a whole. I ignore this point here.
s of theory formation and selection that exist at the interpersonal level in science
op & Downes (2002) have pointed out while this claim may seem attractive, GM say
e some evidence here. (It might perhaps be possible to argue for the existence of such
ls between the way in which science develops and the way in which individuals’
data for which this is supposedly the best explanation actually is.)
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ture about agency and cognition in a more nuanced way.66
One aspect of Solomon’s 2001 position sets her apart from Kit-
cher, and from her earlier work and has an important bearing on
the implications of her view for the Child as Scientist Program.
Solomon 2001 argues that a plausible account of the role which
social institutions play in explaining the success of science should
not start from the assumption that successful science necessarily
involves a global community of scientists coming to a consensus
on one particular theory in a given area. Instead, she suggests,
science is successful when the distribution of belief within the
scientiﬁc community matches the distribution of evidence. Since
in many situations competing pieces of evidence point in different
directions, an epistemically ideal science community will often be
one in which there is no consensus.
This deﬁnition of a successful epistemic community is contro-
versial. If we accept it then it appears to raise problems for the
Child as Scientist program, at least if that Program is understood
in the way I have been suggesting that it should be. For on this ac-
count there seems to be an important mismatch between the tar-
get of a theory of rational belief change in science and the target of
the sort of explanation that an advocate of the Child as Scientist
program wants to put forward. Within developmental psychology
of the sort that GM are doing what is to be explained is how chil-
dren settle on one particular theory of a target domain, and not
how either individual children or groups of children distribute be-
lief between different candidate theories.
I shall not explore this line of thought in detail for two reasons.
First one might hold that in at least some cases the appropriate dis-
tribution of evidence across a community of scientists would in-
volve that community coming to form a consensus, and one
might look for analogies between these cases and cases of children
ﬁxing on a single theory in a particular area. Secondly Solomon’s
work provides us with reasons for being skeptical of ECI which
are independent of these concerns about the rationality of consen-
sus in a particular area.
One such line of thought relies on the idea that both motiva-
tional biases and what she calls ‘cognitive biases’ – features such
as belief perseverance and salience effects, will very often lead
individuals to accept theories which are less well-supported than
their rivals, but that under the right sorts of circumstances these
sorts of bias can counteract one another. Whether this happens
in any particular case will depend on the form which the social
institutions of science take.67 However, insofar as the social institu-
tions of science interact with cognitive biases in such a way as to en-
sure that the distribution of belief within a society matches the
distribution that would be given if only epistemic factors played a
role, they are relevant to explaining the success of science. In the
perhaps rare case where consensus is appropriate, it seems as
though this would require social biases and epistemic biases to can-
cel one another out.68 And to the extent that cognitive biases are
ineliminable, it seems to follow that social factors would be involved66 Solomon (1994, 2001).
67 Solomon (2001) introduces the terminology of ‘decision vectors’ with both ‘epistemic
ideal epistemic outcome is one which involves a distribution of belief between different
epistemic decision vectors). But in the special case where the ideal is consensus, which I am
to that found in Solomon (1994).
68 Solomon insists on several occasions that her 2002 view should not be regarded as a
outcome does not typically involve consensus. In the perhaps unusual case where consensu
would not be appropriate to see here position in the way I have suggested.
69 Stich (1990) and Sterelny (2003).
70 The sorts of biasses Solomon discusses appear to be topic neutral. If they were not it wo
set of non-topic neutral biases in areas where children need to theorize successfully would
which were not the same as the mechanisms which underpinned successful scientiﬁc the
71 As evidenced by their reliance on the literature from analytic philosophy of science inin explaining the epistemic success of science. In other words ECI
turns put to be false.
Solomon’s arguments present the advocate of the Child as Sci-
entist problem with a dilemma. Either children are subject to the
same kinds of cognitive biases as adults or they are not. If not, this
suggests that children are in an epistemically superior position to
mature scientists, and seems to undermine the case for thinking
that a comparison between children and scientists will be illumi-
nating. On the other hand, if, as seems more plausible, they are
subject to these biases, then the Child as Scientist Program seems
importantly incomplete: it owes us an account of the sorts of coun-
tervailing mechanisms which, in the child’s case, do the work
which is done, on Solomon’s account, by the social institutions of
science.
One somewhat speculative response to this argument may be
worth considering. It is that while the sort of biasing factors to
which Solomon draws attention need to be compensated for in
grown-up science, they do not threaten children’s construction of
common-sense theories in the same way. Indeed, they might even,
on occasion play a positive role in children’s learning. Perhaps evo-
lution has provided us with a set of cognitive biases that made us
more, rather than less, likely to come up with true common-sense
theories in the sorts of areas that children needed to theorize
about.
This response has two weaknesses. First, we should not always
expect evolution to set us up to acquire true theories. For there
might be cases in which biases towards falsehood in certain areas
might be more ﬁtness enhancing (for example, if errors of one sort
are much more costly than errors of another sort, then we might
expect evolution to ‘overcompensate’ by giving us a cognitive sys-
tem which was much less likely to produce the second sort of error
even at the expense of giving us more errors of the ﬁrst sort and
even more errors overall)69. Second, it is hard to see how there could
be a set of more or less ‘topic-neutral’ cognitive biases which im-
pacted positively on the sorts of theorizing that children needed to
engage in while impacting negatively on the sorts of theorizing that
adults were engaged in.70
8. Concluding Remarks
I have argued that there is a tension between GM’s advocacy of
a picture of science which is committed to a form of cognitive indi-
vidualism, and their claim that it is analytic philosophers of science
who are best placed to tell us about what science is.71
One response would be to suggest that the turn away from cog-
nitive individualism in recent philosophy of science is a mistake.
This seems unlikely: Epistemic Cognitive Individualism is a doc-
trine which should ought to seem implausible once it is explicitly
formulated. To an unprejudiced eye, two features of science seem
to stand out. The ﬁrst is the complexity of the division of epistemic
labour which science involves. The second is the degree to which
science, more than any other ﬁeld of cognitive endeavour, seems’ and non-epistemic’ elements to them. This terminology makes for clarity when the
hypotheses (the ideal being when it is distributed in ways which correspond to the
considering here, it seems to add little to the account given here, which corresponds
‘balance of biases view’. I take this to be because she thinks that the ideal epistemic
s is the ideal outcome – which is the case I’m discussing here, it’s difﬁcult to see why it
uld not help GM much at this point. For to suggest that nature has equipped us with a
in effect be to suggest that children’s learning in these domains relied on mechanisms
orizing.
giving an account of what a theory is: see Gopnik & Meltzoff, pp. 32–41.
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for thinking that these two are signiﬁcantly linked.72
A better response would be to attempt to reformulate the Child
as Scientist Program in a way as to avoid any commitment to Epi-
stemic Cognitive Individualism. There is no obvious reason why
this should be impossible. I have argued that the Child as Scientist
Program is best understood as a view about analogies between
conceptual development in science and in young children. Some-
one who accepts this needs not thereby be committed to any par-
ticular view about the nature of science.
Would this entail a drastic a revision of GM’s position? Perhaps
not. One might think that their position, as explicitly stated, is
compatible with something like the following view: both scientists
and young children are - like all cognizers73– embedded in social
settings which play an important role in scaffolding their cognitive
development, and these social settings play a similar role in scaffold-
ing the development of science and in the cognitive development of
children.74
Nevertheless, the Child as Scientist Program is not simply a set
of written views, but a program of research in developmental psy-
chology. As Lakatos and Kuhn have taught us, understanding a pro-
grams of research involves more than simply understanding views
which are explicitly formulated. Programs of research can also in-
clude unformulated or half-formulated assumptions which inﬂu-
ence the questions which researchers regard as worth taking
seriously.
If one thinks that the interaction between social settings and
the cognitive mechanisms of individual cognizers plays an impor-
tant role in understanding cognitive development, then it seems
plausible that these interactions will merit detailed empirical
investigation. GM and researchers inﬂuenced by them have shown
relatively little interest in investigating such matters. Furthermore
even when they do concede that social setting does play a role in
cognitive development, they do so in a way which shows just
how committed they are to ECI. For when they consider the role
of social setting in cognitive development they tend treat chil-
dren’s relations with others as simply providing themwith another
sort of data to theorise about.75
A version of the Child as Scientist program that did not incorpo-
rate ECI could, then, be expected to be different from what GM
have given us in two respects. First, we might expect it to empha-
sise the interaction between the cognitive and the social to a great-
er extent and to make it more explicitly the object of detailed
empirical study. Secondly, we might expect it to conceptualise
these interactions as involving more than the acquisition of new
kinds of data by enquiring subjects. One might nonetheless hope
that it could be intellectually fruitful, and also that it might attract
the interest of philosophers of science whose sympathy with some
aspects of the Child as Scientist Program is in tension with their
rejection of cognitive individualism.76Acknowledgments
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